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STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW
PETITIONER TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
RESULTS, AND BY REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO
TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act confers an express
grant

of

discretion

to

admit

or

exclude

evidence

irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.
8(1)(b)(1).

that

is

Section 63-46b-

Therefore, deference should be given to an ALJ's

exclusion of evidence, and the decision of the agency unless its
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 108 (Utah
App. 1992), quoting Pro-Bennett Staffing v. Board of Review, 775
P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989).
2. THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63
(Utah App. 1991) , this Court held that a party challenging the
sufficiency

of

the

evidence

to

support

the

findings,

demonstrate that the findings are not supported by

must

substantial

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g).
To establish that the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings, a party must marshall the evidence in support of the
findings, and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
findings are not adequately supported.

Heinecke v. Department of

Commerce, 158 UAR 55, 57 (Utah App. 1981), quoting Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App,. 1989).
2

3. THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION.
The Division has a statutory grant of discretion to
impose sanctions against licensees for violations of the rules
governing the profession. Accordingly, this court will not disturb
the

agency's

decision

unless

it

is clearly

unreasonable

or

otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Johnson-Bowles v. Division
of Securities. 829 P.2d 101, 116 (Utah App. 1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Section 63-46b-8, UTAH CODE ANN. (1989).
Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii),
in all adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted
as follows:
(b) On his own Motion or upon objection by a party,
the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial,
or unduly repetitious.

Section 58-35-11, UTAH CODE ANN.

(1990).

The Division may refuse to renew, or may suspend or revoke any
license issued under this chapter upon proof, after a hearing,
that the licensee engaged in unprofessional conduct.

3

POINT 1
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULTS, AND BY
REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD.
Licensee asserts that the Administrative Law Judge erred by
refusing to allow her to introduce evidence of polygrciph results,
and by refusing to allow polygraph examiners to testify before the
Board.
Section 63-46b-8(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN., provides that the
presiding

officer

may

exclude

evidence

that

is

irrelevant,

immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Relying on this authority, the
Administrative Law Judge granted the Division's motion to exclude
all polygraph evidence.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act confers an express
grant

of

discretion

to

admit

or

exclude

evidence

irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.
8(1)(b)(1).

that

is

Section 63-46b-

Due to this grant of discretion, deference should be

given to an ALJ's exclusion of evidence, and to the decision of the
agency,

unless

its

determination

reasonableness and rationality.

exceeds

the

bounds

of

Johnson-Bowles v. Division of

Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 108 (Utah App. 1992), quoting Pro-Bennett
Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989).
In this case, the ruling to exclude the polygraph evidence
prohibited any mention by her witnesses and counsel concerning the
polygraph examination or the results of that examination; precluded
the polygraph examiners from testifying in this matter; and
4

excluded any and all exhibits which would mention the polygraph
examination or the results. (R. at 448). The evidence was excluded
by the ALJ without any regard to foundation for assessing the
reliability and probative value of the polygraph examination.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the strict rules as to
the

admissibility

of

evidence

are

somewhat

relaxed

in

administrative hearings. State Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980).

Petitioner

asserts that this ruling excluding this evidence was unreasonable
and irrational, and is not consistent with the relaxed rules of
evidence that apply at administrative hearings.
relaxed

standard,

petitioner

contends that

In light of this
to

deny

her

the

opportunity to introduce the polygraph evidence is unreasonable and
prejudicial.

This

is particularly

true when other evidence

(i.e.hearsay) which would not be allowed in trial courts was
admitted in the hearing.
It is clear that polygraph examination results may be admitted
into evidence when there is a valid stipulation between the
parties.

State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 998 (Utah 1979).

The Court

in Abel expressly left open the question of whether polygraph
results may be admitted in the absence of a stipulation.
Licensee urges this court to rule that if the conditions
required in State v. Rebetrano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984), for
admission of stipulated polygraph results in trial courts are met,
then the results should be admitted

into evidence without a

stipulation in administrative hearings.

First, participation in

5

the examination must be free and voluntary.

The ALJ must be

allowed to exclude evidence if the examiner was not qualified, or
if the conditions under which the test was administered were
unfair.

The party opposing the evidence must also be allowed to

cross examine the examiner as to his expertise; the reliability of
polygraph examinations; and the accuracy of the apparatus used.
The trier of fact should also be instructed that the examiners
opinion is not conclusive, but is only to be taken as an opinion.
Id. at 12 68.

If these conditions are met, a licensee should be

allowed to introduce the results of the polygraph examination in an
administrative hearing, even in the absence of a stipulation.
The Division argues in its brief that there is no reason for
polygraph results to be admitted at administrative hearings in the
absence of a stipulation.

The reasoning of the Division is that

polygraph evidence is not more reliable in an

administrative

proceeding than in a trial court. However, hearsay and other forms
of evidence that might be inadmissible in a court of law may be
considered during an administrative hearing.
County Attorney.

Tolman v. Salt Lake

818 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1991).

Licensee

submits that these forms of evidence are not more reliable in a
court of law than they are in an administrative proceeding.

The

administrative hearing is the most appropriate forum for admission
of polygraph evidence (or at least consideration of admission
following foundational testimony) due to the less formal rules
governing these hearings.
The Division has argued in its brief that Nelson cannot argue
6

that the exclusion of polygraph evidence was prejudicial to her
because that evidence is not part of the record.

The Division

reasons that this court could not determine whether Nelson suffered
substantial prejudice even upon concluding that the polygraph
results should have been admitted in the administrative hearing.
Licensee asserts that the proffer of the evidence in this case was
sufficient.
In her response to the Division's motion to exclude this
evidence, Nelson states that the polygraph examination corroborated
her testimony that she did not have a sexual relationship with
Griffith in 1985.

(R.at 390).

Nelson also proffered that the

polygraph examiners were experienced members of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's office who had conducted many examinations and
have testified in court regarding their examination which they had
preformed.

Nelson also offered to submit affidavits as to the

credentials of the examiners used, and further proffered that the
polygraph examination was professionally done and the results
accurate.

(R.at 390).

The division has also argued that Nelson cannot show she was
substantially
evidence.

prejudiced

by

the

exclusion

of

the

polygraph

Nelson asserts that the prejudice she suffered as a

result of the exclusion of the polygraph evidence is clear.
First and foremost, it must be remembered that only Nelson and
Griffith know whether they engaged in sexual activity while in
Hawaii.

Griffith testified that the activity did take place;

Nelson testified that the activity did not take place.
7

Nelson maintains that the Administrative Law Judge's refusal
to allow the polygraph evidence denied her the opportunity to
corroborate the veracity of her statements.

POINT II
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985.
In its brief, the Division has asserted that Nelson is barred
from challenging the Findings, because Nelson did not marshall the
evidence which supports the finding.

Nelson asserts that she did

indeed marshall the evidence which supports the division's finding,
but argues that the evidence, when marshalled, does not support the
finding.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63 (Utah
App.

1991) , this

sufficiency

of

Court

the

held

evidence

that
to

a

party

support

the

challenging

the

findings,

must

demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g).
To establish that the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings, a party must marshall the evidence in support of the
findings, and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
findings are not adequately supported.

Heinecke v. Department of

Commerce, 158 UAR 55, 57 (Utah App. 1981), quoting Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App,. 1989).
The Division, in attempting to show that Nelson did not
marshall the evidence which supports the finding of a sexual
8

relationship in 1985, points to the testimony of Griffith's brother
and of his ex-wife. (Brief of R. page 29.) This "evidence" is that
these individuals testified that Griffith told them that he had a
sexual relationship with the therapist.
information in her brief.

Nelson included this

(Brief of petitioner p.17).

The

testimony of Kathy Lavatt was identical; that is to say she
testified to what Griffith had told her.
The division also points to the testimony of witness Carlton
Stubing in attempting to show that Nelson did not marshall the
evidence which supported the decision.

The statement of witness

Stubing was that Nelson told her that she had some fear of
abandonment that had been based on a past relationship Griffith.
(Tr. at 484)

This statement was reportedly made by Nelson to

witness Stubing in 1989.
The Division also argues that the letters written by Nelson to
Griffith

in 1988 corroborate the fact that sexual relations

occurred between them in 1985.

(Brief of R. at 30).

The Division

draws this conclusion from the following excerpt: Although I have
many more feelings and thoughts about our "relationship" I just
couldn't bring myself to risk by expressing them. Licensee submits
that

neither

this

letter, nor

any

other

letter

introduced,

corroborates that sexual activity occurred between Nelson and
Griffith in 1985.

9

In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board
determined that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual activity while
in Hawaii in September, 1985, and found that Licensee had not
properly terminated the client/therapist relationship at that time.
The basis for finding that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual
conduct while in Hawaii in 1985 comes from the testimony of K.G.
Licensee contends that this testimony is false and incredible.
Indeed, the Board in Finding of Fact #16 determined that
there is a lack of credible evidence to find that the conduct took
place

as

specifically

proceeding.

described

(R. at 71) .

by

K.G.

during

the

instant

By finding that there is a lack of

credible evidence to believe that the conduct took place as
described by K.G., the Board chose not to believe the particulars
of his testimony on this issue.
Licensee contends that as the board clearly did not
believe this portion of K.G.'s testimony, and thcit there is no
credible evidence upon which to base the finding that the activity
occurred.
As

the

Board

explicitly

rejected

K.G.'s

specific

rendition of the alleged sexual activity in Hawaii in 1985, this
Court should find that this finding is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.
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POINT III
THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION.
The Division has a statutory grant of discretion to
impose sanctions against licensees for violations of the rules
governing the profession. Accordingly, this court will not disturb
the

agency's

decision

unless

it

is clearly

unreasonable

or

otherwise an abuse of that discretion. Johnson-Bowles v. Division
of Securities. 829 P.2d 101, 116 (Utah App. 1992).
Despite the fact that the Division has broad discretion,
reason dictates that the most severe sanctions of revocation or
suspension of a professional license should be reserved for the
most serious breaches of ethical conduct.
In its brief, the Division asserts that the non-sex related
violations were just as serious as the violation of the rule
prohibiting sexual relations with a client. (Respondent's Brief at
31) .

While it is true that the Division found the nature of the

bartering agreement between Nelson and Griffith to be unethical, it
can hardly be maintained that the non-sexual violations warrant
suspension of the licenses.
Licensee

contends

that

the

suspension

or

revocation

of

licenses should be reserved for the most serious violations of the
ethical standards of the profession.

Licensee exercised poor

judgment with regard to Griffith, but as the sexual conduct is
insufficient to justify the finding that a sexual relationship
occurred in Hawaii in 1985, her licenses should not be suspended
11

nor should she be restricted from private practice of social
work.

CONCLUSION
Licensee urges this court to overturn the portion of the Order
suspending her licenses, and barring her from the private practice
of social work.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ /

day of June, 1993.

N. PAPPAS ^

/J7/

torney for Petitioner
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